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THE  CHALLENGE
Foreign  aid,  from  its  irresolute  beginnings  a  decade  ago,  has  re-
mained  a  program  to  influence  the  mind  of  the  non-industrialized
world toward an acceptance  of Western methods  and Western  philoso-
phy  in  its  quest  for  economic  progress.  President  Truman  phrased
this  purpose  in his  Point  Four message  of  January  1949:
We proclaim  to  the world  the essential principles  of the faith by which
we  live  and  declare  our  aims  to  all  people  ...  we must embark  on  a bold
new  programme  for  sending  the  benefits  of  our  scientific  advances  and
industrial  progress  available  for  the  improvement  and  growth  of  under-
developed areas  ...  the key  to greater  production is  a wider more vigorous
application  of modern  scientific  and technical  knowledge.
Foreign aid comprises a response to a challenge,  and that challenge
lies  partially  in  the widespread  poverty  of Asia  and  Africa,  and  par-
tially  in  the  American  concept  of  the  cold  war  in  the  non-European
world.
Throughout  Asia  and  the  Middle  East the  impact  of  the  West  is
old.  Since  1900,  countless  native  sons  of  these  areas  have  studied  in
Western  universities  and have returned  home with  the  conviction  that
their  countries  can  emulate  the  West  successfully.  They  set  out  to
develop  their  backward  economies  from  the  top  downward  and  the
outside  inward. However,  as late  as World War II economic  expansion
was  limited  to  some  cities  and  a  few  large  projects.  Throughout  the
underdeveloped  areas  were  pockets  of  economic  development  sur-
rounded  by  seas  of  primitive  rural  cultures  organized  at  subsistence
levels.
Since  World  War  II  the  impact  of  the  West  on  the  backward
regions  has  been  accelerated.  During  recent  years  millions  of  Asians
and  Africans  have  discovered,  through  radio  and  travel,  that  else-
where  the  world  has  undergone  tremendous  economic  development.
This  knowledge has  been broadened  by the efforts  of the  industrialized
nations  to advertise  their wealth and create the  illusion that any  nation
which  adopts  their economic  organization  can  enjoy similar  standards
of living.  Now the masses  of Asia  and Africa  want the progress which
their past leadership has  been unable to achieve.  This resulting demand
for  economic  betterment,  plus  racial  and  political  equality  with  the
West,  undergirds  the  revolutionary  fervor  sweeping  the  underdevel-
20oped  world.  Nations  such as  the  United  States,  having  stimulated  the
desire  of these regions  for modern,  industrialized  living,  now face  the
problem  of  helping  them  realize  their  economic  dreams.
Under  any  circumstance  the  challenge  of  these  vast,  backward
continents  would  be  serious  enough.  The  Soviet  purpose  to  provide
them  with  alternative  concepts  and  methods  for  achieving  their  new
aspirations  heightens  that  challenge.  Since  1956,  the  U.S.S.R.  has
entered  the  field  of  foreign  aid  on  a  broad  scale  and  has  revealed
every  intention  of  remaining  there.  The loans  and barter  deals  made
by  the  Soviet bloc  have  steadily  widened  from  piecemeal  beginnings
to what  appears  to  be  a  grand  strategy.  Moreover,  both  the  Russian
economy  and  Russian  technology  appear  capable  of  sustaining  an
ever-widening  scale  of  Soviet  activity  in  Asia  and  the  Middle  East.
Russia  has  advantages  over  the  West  in  penetrating  the  under-
developed  nations  through  policies  of trade and aid.  Having  no tradi-
tion  of  "colonialism"  in  the  regions  of  South  and  Southeast  Asia  or
the Middle  East,  the Kremlin  can make  its pretense  of "disinterested-
ness"  appear  exceedingly  plausible.  The  Soviet  leaders,  moreover,
need  not  stress  self-interest  to  gain  support  at  home  for  expensive
foreign  aid  policies.  Nor  need  they  curtail  their  ambitions  because
of insufficient  personnel  to carry out their objectives.  They need make
no  precise  accounting  for  policies  having  primarily  political  rather
than economic  purposes.  Lastly,  Russia,  unlike  the United  States  and
much  of  Western  Europe,  can  actually  use  large  quantities  of  what
the underdeveloped  areas can place on the world market. This situation
permits Russia to make barter arrangements,  which  are far more satis-
factory  emotionally and  economically  to  the  selling  nation than  some
system  of foreign  aid  which  has  all the  appearance  of  a hand-out.  In
such nations  as Egypt  and Burma the Russians have done well because
they  can  use  the  cotton  and  rice  which  these  countries  produce  in
excess  of  domestic  demand.
But the  Soviet challenge  is far more pervasive  than Russian rubles
and goods available  for export would suggest.  Every national economy
requires  a  capital  fund  large  enough  to sustain  its  own economic  ex-
pansion.  Countries  with  primitive  economic  levels  have  no  local  sur-
plus of capital for expansion  of the  economy.  The U.S.S.R.  has shown
that  a  nation  can  build  its  economy  through  controlled  production
and consumption  rather than  awaiting  the slow  accumulation  of capi-
tal  through  the  profits  of  private  enterprise.  The  Soviet  system  has
accepted  the  sacrificing  of the  lives  and  comforts  of many  for one  or
several generations  in the hope of building  eventually a  high-producing
economy.  It  has  accepted  tyranny  as  the  price  of  material  progress.
21The  Soviet approach  to industrial  growth  emphasizes  cooperation  and
national  purpose  rather than  individual  wealth or individual freedom.
The Communist  way  presents  an  approach  to  nations  in  a  hurry  and
with  an  awakening  national  consciousness,  but  with  insufficient  re-
sources  to permit great capital  accumulation  through private economic
activity.  The  power  of communism  to  arouse  revolutionary  fervor  in
the  Orient was  demonstrated  forcefully  in both China and  Indo-China
during  the  immediate  postwar  years.
Unfortunately  the  United  States  cannot serve  as  a  model  for Asia
and  Africa.  This  nation  grew  up  in  a  spacious  and  richly  laden  con-
tinent;  its  system  and  achievements  cannot  be  duplicated  anywhere.
As Walter Lippmann  wrote  recently:
We cannot  beat the Soviet  example  by  our example.  For we  are not an
example  that  backward  peoples  can  follow,  and  unless  we  can  manage  to
create  an example  which they  can follow, we  shall  almost certainly lose the
Cold War  in  Asia and  Africa,  and  perhaps elsewhere.
Can  the  West  demonstrate  to  the  poverty  stricken  that  they  can
achieve  economic  progress  without  resort  to  sacrifice  and  tyranny?
If  the  nations  of  Asia  and  Africa  are  to  avoid  this  cost,  they  must
either  abandon  their national  goals  or seek  outside capital to build up
productive  capacity  until  local  income  creates  capital  to  replace  that
from abroad.  At some point an expanding  economy  will attract private
investment,  and  thus  enter  the  circle  of  modernized,  advanced,  and
industrial  societies.  In the long run,  a  program  for sustained economic
growth  should  be  self-liquidating,  but  this  is feasible  only  where  re-
sources  and governmental  administration  are  adequate.
Certainly  the  Eisenhower  administration  has  recognized  the  chal-
lenge of the Communist example.  Its most ambitious  effort  to promote
a sustained foreign  aid program came in February  1958,  when it called
a  foreign  aid  conference  in  Washington.  This  hand-picked  group  of
business  and political  leaders was addressed  by both the President and
the Secretary  of State,  as  well  as by  such leaders  of the  political  oppo-
sition  as  former  President  Harry  Truman  and  Adlai  Stevenson.  The
tone  of the conference  was  non-partisan,  but Truman queried:
Why haven't  we  come  forward  with  some  new ideas,  ideas  to  compare
with  Point Four,  the  Marshall  Plan,  the Atlantic Treaty? . . . We  live today
in  a  dearth  of  ideas.  The  clock  has  been turned  back  to  the  1920's.  Let's
run  the  hands  of  the  clock  up  to  date  with  new  ideas  to  meet  today's
problems.
Stevenson  appealed  for a "sustained,  thought-through,  and  coordi-
nated"  foreign  aid  program  which  would  help  underdeveloped  coun-
tries  to "economic  and  social health  and  self-reliance  without military
strings."
22India will  demonstrate  whether  a country can  raise  its standard  of
living  in  the  face  of  the  normal  and  traditional  handicaps  of  back-
wardness and  poverty. India  is  a vital region  for the  West.  If it should
follow  the  example  of  China,  the  two  greatest  nations  of Asia  would
be  Communist  dominated.  The  danger  is  that  India,  impatient  like
the  rest of Asia,  may decide  to pay the Communist  price for progress.
To  reach  the  point  of  economic  take-off,  India  requires  about  eight
to ten billion dollars  over the  next five to ten years.  Her present Five-
Year  Plan  calls for  about  one billion  a year  over  the  next five  years.
This  money  is  required  for  agricultural  expansion,  dams,  electric
power,  fertilizer factories,  and the exploitation  of resources in oil,  iron,
and  other  metals.
India  can  achieve its  goals  if  any Asiatic  nation  can,  since it  has
good  administration  and  an  educated  leadership.  The  United  States
at least partially  has the  power to spare India a generation  of sacrifice
by  giving  it  a  democratic  solution.  Through  the  Marshall  Plan  the
United  States  provided  foreign  aid  to  help  Western  Europe  break
through the "sound barrier"  of sustained investment.  Lack of financial
means is not the obstacle that prevents  the United  States from develop-
ing  a  sustained  program  for Asia.  As  Barbara  Ward  has  written,  the
reason  is "simply  a  paralysis  of  imagination,  a  crisis  in  energy  and
will."
EVALUATION  OF  PROGRESS
If  the  foreign  aid  program  of  the  United  States  has  faltered,  the
impediments  have  run  deeper  than  cost  and  execution.  First  of  all,
the building  up of a backward  economy,  even with  foreign capital and
technology,  is not  a simple  task. Too  often foreign aid  is based on the
false  assumption  that  if  the  rich  nations  export  some  of  their  excess
capital  and  know-how,  the  poor  recipients  will  also  become  rich.  In-
dustrial  nations have  grown  wealthy  because  of a favorable  combina-
tion of climate,  leadership,  and resources.  Those countries  which have
industry turned  to it early because  they had  people with  initiative  and
energy,  and  who  desired  riches.  The  incentive  did  not  come  from
government; it came from the people themselves.  The government even-
tually stepped in only to regulate and direct the energies and ambitions
already  present.  Underdeveloped  countries  are  poor  because  they
have  lacked  either  resources  or leadership  or both.  Unless  these  two
necessary  ingredients  for  economic  development  exist  in  some  meas-
ure, foreign  aid, even  if properly applied,  is not likely  to produce any
startling  results.
For the past ten years Western capital  and know-how have  poured
into Asia.  Yet,  as in  the prewar years,  progress is still limited to  small
pockets.  The  problem  is not  alone  that  too little  has been  spent.  Per-
23haps  in  some  areas  too much  has been  spent,  because  people  are  not
prepared  to  use what  they  have.  Technological  progress  must  be  ac-
companied  by  developments  in  education,  administration,  organiza-
tion, and  public  services.
In  many  areas  of  Asia  and  the  Middle  East  organization  and
leadership  are  needed more than capital.  Throughout  these backward
regions  extensive  capital  is  already  present  in  the  millions  of  pairs  of
strong  hands.  Unfortunately,  this  form of capital  has little relationship
to  American  financial  institutions.  Big  projects  employing  millions  of
dollars  and  dozens  of  engineers  often  create  political  instability.  Pro-
grams that build pockets  of progress but build no bridges  to the remote
village  economies  merely develop  appetites  which  the  programs  them-
selves  cannot  satisfy.  For  that  reason,  both  foreign  technology  and
local leadership must be concerned  with the small, financially  unattrac-
tive  industries  which  exist  in  the  villages.  Development  of  these  re-
quires  incentive,  organization,  and  simple  tools-not  engineers,  trac-
tors,  cranes,  and  bulldozers.  The  Romans,  with  superb  organization,
built  flourishing  communities  in  regions  that  are  poverty  stricken
today.  At some  point economic  progress  must,  like that  of  the  West,
progress  from  bottom to top rather than from  top to bottom.  In much
of Asia and  the Middle  East,  American  free enterprise  is not  required
so  much  as  local  governments  harnessing  the  energies  of  the  native
population.
Perhaps  Western  civilization  has  elements  more  basic  than  tech-
nology that  should be  exported  to  these  areas.  During  the first half of
this century the young men of Asia who studied in Western  universities
were  as concerned  with law,  history,  and philosophy  as they  were  with
engineering  and  agriculture.  Today  these students,  under  various  pro-
grams,  come in ever  increasing  numbers,  but their energies  are limited
almost  exclusively  to  the  study  of  engineering,  science,  and  other
technical  fields.  This  training  is  useful  and  admirable,  but  it  gives  the
impression  that  the  great  achievements  of  democracy  are  material
rather than  spiritual  and intellectual.  It tends to  adopt the Communist
standard  that  the  system  that  achieves  the  most  materially  is the  best
system.  This  concentration  on technology  does  nothing  to  destroy  the
Soviet  illusion  that  the  Russian  sputniks  and  luniks  are  the  measure
of  the  superiority  of  the  Soviet  system.
As  the  Orient  develops  in  the  coming  decades,  the  more  funda-
mental  and  unique  qualities  of  Western  civilization  must  be  known
and  taught  by  the  philosophers,  teachers,  and  writers  of  Asia.  These
men,  in  the long  run,  will  shape  the opinions  of their  people.  Charles
Malik,  the  Lebanese  Ambassador  to  the  United  Nations,  stressed  the
24importance  of  philosophical  concepts  to  his  region's  future  develop-
ment when he spoke before the World Council of Churches at Evanston
in the  summer of  1954:
For all  their  intricacy,  the  political,  social  and  economic  problems  of
Asia  and  Africa  are  nothing  compared  to  the  intellectual  and  spiritual
problems.  For  we  can  already see  with some assurance  that  if people  are
not  yet fully  able  to exploit  their  own  resources,  they  are  on  the  way to
doing  so; and  if social discrimination  and injustice  still prevail, the one pro-
nounced  temper  of  the  age  is  precisely  to  attack  them.  In these  fields  we
can  see  ahead,  albeit more  or less  dimly.
But what  is  going to happen  to the mind and soul of Asia and Africa?
-that  is  the  question.  Nor is  it  true  that once  people  have  achieved  their
political  independence,  once  they have attained  economic  plenty, and once
they  have  brought  about  social  justice,  the  spirit  then  will  take  care  of
itself.  This  is  the  greatest  fallacy  of  the  present  age,  that  the  mind,  the
spirit, the soul of man, the fundamental  bent of his will,  is derivative  from,
subordinate  to,  a function  of,  his  economic  and social  existence.
American  foreign  aid  programs  have  suffered  from  a  certain
political  aimlessness.  Too  many  supporters  of such  programs  regard
them as self-sufficient  technological enterprises that have but a tenuous
connection  with  the  over-all  foreign  policies  of  the  United  States.
Foreign  aid has seldom  been  tied to the  interests  of the  United  States
except  in vague and sentimental  terms. But purposeful  economic  poli-
cies  are  difficult  to  develop  when  the  fundamental  political  objectives
of the  United  States  in Asia,  the  Middle East,  and  Africa  have  never
been  clearly  defined.  Too  often  the  American  response  is  still deter-
mined  by conflicting  economic  interests  at home.
Since  the economic  aspect  is  only one  element  of a nation's  struc-
ture,  and fundamentally  not  its most important,  too  often Americans
have  overestimated  the  potentials  of  economic  policies.  Many  Amer-
icans  attribute  all  instability  in  the  Orient  to  poverty  and  assume,
therefore,  that economic progress  will bring stability and lasting peace.
The  widespread  assumption that foreign  aid raises  standards  of  living
and promotes  democracy,  and that  democracy,  in turn, promotes  pro-
American  attitudes  in  the  cold war  is  not  necessarily  valid.  Actually
foreign  aid  does  not  touch  the  vital  issues  of  war  and  peace  in  the
world.  American  security  is  threatened  by  the  more highly developed
areas. The  issues that divide  the United  States froi  Russia  and China
can  set off a  general  war,  but  our way  of life  is  threatened  by Soviet
power rather than by the philosophy of the U.S.S.R. As long as Russia
was  an  underdeveloped  country,  it  presented  no  problem  to  the  rest
of the world.
Industrial  development  in  Asia  and  the  Middle  East may lead  to
ambition  and  aggression  instead  of  to  stability.  This  is  particularly
true if any of these nations should be permitted to add atomic weapons
25to  their  meager  arsenals.  The  economic  development  of  Asia  and
Africa  may  easily  create  such  enormous  tensions  that  the  American
people  will  rue  the  day  they  ever  contributed  to  that  development.
Certainly the  new  China,  the product  of intense nationalism  and  eco-
nomic  change,  has  become,  with  its  new  energy  and organization,  an
unprecedented  threat  in  the  Orient.
To  the  extent  that foreign  aid  has  become  a  strategy  in  the  cold
war,  its purpose  has  been  to  prevent  change  in Asia  and  the Middle
East  under  the  assumption  that  all  change  is  Communist  inspired.
The  Eisenhower  Doctrine  for  the  Middle  East,  with  its  foreign  aid
program,  is  designed  to prevent  further  changes by Arab nationalism.
This  approach  to  foreign  aid  denies  the  existence  of  an  indigenous
nationalism that  lies  outside the  Soviet system  or  Soviet purpose.  The
United  States  can  hardly prevent  change in  the underdeveloped  world
because  it  is  no  longer  dormant.  Moreover,  regarding  every  change
as  a  Communist  triumph and  a threat  to American  security will  keep
this  nation  involved  in  affairs  which  have little  actual  relationship  to
American  interests  and  which  can  be  controlled  only  at  great  price.
Perhaps  the  chief impediment  to the  full development of a  foreign
aid  program  has  been  this  nation's  refusal  to  recognize  nationalism
rather  than  communism  as  the  great  force  for  change  in  the  Afro-
Asian world. Foreign aid has been developed  less to meet the demands
of  nationalism  or the  needs  of  humanity  than  to  bring  Asia  and  the
Middle  East  actively  into  the  cold  war  for  the  purpose  of  building
centers  of opposition to the  Soviet-Chinese  bloc.
American  expenditures  in  Asia  and  the  Middle  East  have  been
used  primarily  to  underwrite  the  American  alliance  system.  When
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, at the February  1958 conference
in  Washington,  spoke  for  expanded  foreign  aid,  he  pointed  out  that
it  would  assure  this  nation  of  military  bases  around  the  world  and
would help maintain retaliatory forces in strategic areas. This approach
to foreign  aid stood in sharp contrast to that of Anushan Agafonovich,
Director  of the  Soviet  Institute of  World Economic  and International
Relations,  who  assured  the  delegates  at  the  Afro-Asian  conference
at  Cairo  in  December  1957  that no military  or  political  strings  were
attached  to  Russian  aid.  "We  do  not  ask  you,"  he  said,  "to join  any
blocs  or  change  governments  or  change  internal  or foreign  policies."
In recent years  only a  small  percentage  of the  total American  foreign
aid budget has  gone into technical  assistance or economic development
programs.  The  vast bulk has  gone  into  "defense  support."
This military  aid  has  bought  little  defense  in  Asia  or the  Middle
East.  Much  of  the military  equipment  lies  around,  wasted.  Too  often
26the financial  support has  created  armies  too  large  for  the size  of  the
population  or the wealth  of the region.  This  has been most obvious  in
Korea  and  Formosa;  but  even  in  Vietnam,  President  Diem  has  ad-
mitted  that the money spent  on  armies could better  go  into programs
of land reform.  If these armies  of Southeast  Asia and  the Middle East
are  designed  to stop an  aggression  of  Chinese  or  Soviet forces,  their
significance  is  not apparent.  Such  allies  are weak reeds  upon which  to
build cold war policy  in the Far and Middle  East.
If the alliance  of the United  States with Japan  is sound,  it is much
harder  to find any benefit  at all in either the SEATO  or the Baghdad
pacts.  These  alliances  are  supposedly  based  on  common  interests-
opposing  an open attack from  the Soviet bloc.  Actually, Asian leaders
believe  the  danger  of  such  aggression  is  so  remote  as  to  be  almost
non-existent.  The  SEATO  pact  requires  nothing  of  the  Asian  mem-
bers-no  common  objective,  policy,  or  action-beyond  an  avowed
opposition  to  communism  at  home  and  abroad.  The  Asian  allies,  for
example,  could not differ  more completely  from  the United  States  on
any issue than they do  on China policy.  Yet for the  United States this
pact  is a major  commitment  and requires  specific  policies  and actions
in  behalf  of the  Asian  members.  For the  United  States,  the  alliance
comprises  a  unilateral  burden.
Asian  members  regard  membership  in  SEATO  as  constituting  a
special  claim  upon  the  American  Treasury,  American  weapons,  and
American  political  support  for  the  groups  in  power.  The  prime  min-
ister of one Asian  ally went so far  as  to equate  his  country's  member-
ship  in  SEATO  with  membership  in  the  United  Nations.  How  such
an  alliance  can contribute  anything  positive  to  American  defense  or
how it can  help in  taking concerted  action  in  any major  crisis is  diffi-
cult  to  see.  The  political  liability  it creates  is  almost  beyond calcula-
tion, for it denies  the role of nationalism in change and seems  to prove
the Soviet contention  that any nation can obtain American aid through
alliance with the United States.  SEATO, moreover,  offends the neutral
nations  of  Southeast  Asia,  such  as India,  Ceylon,  Burma,  and  Indo-
nesia,  who  believe  that  the  alliance  is  a  needless  source  of  tension
and  have  refused  to join  it.
This  American  tendency  to emphasize  defense  in  its  foreign  aid
program  poses  a  further  intellectual  dilemma.  The  single-minded
search  for those  who oppose  communism  leads  to the  support of  any
regime  that  claims  to be  anti-Communist  under  the  assumption  that
such  a  regime  must  be  democratic.  Under  this  theory,  any  political
leader  becomes a defender  of liberty by joining the Western  bloc.  This
would  make  Hitler  the  greatest  of  all  democrats.  The  United  States,
in  its search  for  allies  against  the  Soviet  Union,  ignores  the  fact that
27"anti-communism"  is  not synonymous  with the  Soviet  Union.  Chiang
Kai-shek  has  demonstrated  the  falsity  of  the  former;  Gomulka  of
Poland,  Tito of Yugoslavia,  and Mao  Tse-tung of China have demon-
strated  the  falsity  of  the  latter.
CONCLUSION
Foreign  aid is  one of many policies  available  to  a wealthy nation.
Like any other policy,  its success hinges  on the validity of the assump-
tions  on  which  it is  based.  If its  ultimate impact  on  world stability  is
uncertain,  it need not endanger American  security. On the other hand,
foreign  aid  is  no  panacea.  Its  employment  as  national  policy  must
always  reflect  the  best  evaluation  of  American  interests  in  terms  of
the  conflicting  forces  in  areas  where  it  is  applied.  The  nation  must
recognize  that no country  can  annex  another  or even  gain control  of
its  foreign  policy  through  trade  or  investment,  any  more  than  one
nation  can  destroy  the  national  sovereignty  of  another  through  a
Communist  revolution.
It  is  reassuring  to  reflect  that  the U.S.S.R.  has  not  annexed  any
territory  except  through  the presence  of  its  armies.  Through  subver-
sion  and  revolution  it  has  acquired  nothing  except  a  temporary  ally
in China and perhaps a portion of Indo-China.  All nations  have  goals
and interests of their own,  and in any crisis they  will make those deci-
sions  which  best  serve  their  national  interests.  Allies  are  won  in  a
crisis  by  the  over-all  quality  of  a  nation's  foreign  policy,  not by  the
amount  of its past economic  or military  aid,  or even  the nature  of its
economic  system.
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